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By simultaneously considering both the auction and contract design aspects
of competitive contracting we discover that optimal competitive contracting
may require substantially more cost or production sharing than can simply
be attributed to any need for risk sharing. The paper starts by reviev/ing
the basic issues in each of the auction and contracting literatures 3 using
a simple example to illustrate. Te then solve the example explicitly tc
substantiate the intuition developed in the previous sections. Finally,
the second part of the paper proposes a formal model of competitive contracting
and then uses this model to formally show that the phenomena exhibited by
the example occur far more generally.

Introduction:
Thousands of years ago, the Babylonians auctioned marriage con-
tracts. The prospective bridegroom offering to pay the most, or in
the case of an unattractive damsel, demanding the smallest additional
marriage portion, won that maiden's hand in marriage. Since then,
contracts for the sale or purchase of automobiles, antiques, paintings,
houses, horses, farm machinery, flowers, tobacco, commodities futures,
treasury bills, mineral rights, defense systems, entire corporations,
miscellaneous junk, and—well, you name it!—have been let to the
bidder offering to pay the most, or asking to be paid the least. Now,
the combined value of contracts auctioned in a single day typically
runs to many millions of dollars. Few, if any, market mechanisms can
match the prominence of auctions and competitive bidding.
The prevalence of competitive bidding as a means for letting
contracts may well stem from the relatively passive role assigned to
the contract lettor. He need merely offer a contract to be let; com-
petitive bidding can do the rest. No matter whether the bidding
involves sealed envelopes containing slips of paper stating the dollar
amounts being offered for mineral leases, or voluminous written propo-
sals detailing the development of a new defense system or the take
over of an entire corporation, or a chattering auctioneer cajoling his
audience into making ever larger offers for a piece of used farm
machinery, or a silent clock quickly, quietly ticking down the asking
price for a lot of cut flowers, the bidding determines not only who
wins what, but also who pays whom how much. (See Cassady (1967) for a
myriad of other bidding systems.)
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Despite the obvious importance of competitively bid contracts, the
design of such contracts has so far almost completely escaped formal
study. (Samuelson (1979) does examine competitive bidding for con-
tracts, but explicitly and intentionally avoids the moral hazard issue—
a central issue in our investigation.) Granted, the last few years
saw considerable advances in theory of auctions and competitive
bidding—the Stark, and Rothkopf (1979) bibliography lists approxi-
mately 500 works on the subject, and many more have appeared since
they compiled their bibliography— but the theory focuses on auction
design to the exclusion of contract design. Similarly, the equally
rapidly developing theory of contract design takes up the problem only
once the winner has been chosen, thereby ignoring the possibility that
the form of the contract might affect the bidding on and the selection
of a winner for the contract.
This failure to simultaneously consider both the bidding and
contract design aspects of competitively let contracts matters only to
the extent that combining the results of the separate auction and
contract design literatures fails to yield optimal competitive con-
tracting. In this paper, we motivate, illustrate, and prove that the
bidding and contract design aspects must be considered simultaneously
in order to maximize the bid-taker's expected utility. Specifically,
we discover that optimal—from the view of the bid-taker—competitively
bid contracts involve more cost or production sharing between the
winner and the bid-taker than can be attributed to any need for risk
sharing.
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The development proceeds in two parts, the first motivating and
illustrating the need to simultaneously consider both aspects of com-
petitive contracting, and the second providing a formal mathematical
analysis. The first part starts with a very simple, stylized example
of competitive contracting. The following two sections discuss the
contract and auction design problems, referring to the example to
identify the interaction between the two design problems in the case
of competitive contracting. This first part of the paper concludes
with two sections analyzing the example, and thereby illustrating the
intuition developed in earlier sections.
The second part of the paper starts by defining a formal model of
competitive contracting—a model that allows for quite a variety of
different auction mechanisms. The following section defines an
appropriate solution concept for our model and discusses the rela-
tionship of this concept to the more commonly used Nash equilibrium.
Next, we solve the model to obtain an explicit expression for the
expected payments of bidders as a function of the model's parameters.
By varying these parameters, we vary the type of auction used and the
form of contract let. The fourth and fifth sections, respectively,
examine the effects of the auction and contract forms on the bid-
taker's expected utility. The paper concludes with some suggestions
for further research.
A Simple Example
:
A simple mathematical example will illustrate the basic issues,
intuition, and results in the design of competitive contracting.
Although stated in the context of mineral rights leasing, the example
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makes no pretense at being realistic. Rather, it simply exemplifies
the key elements of competitive contracting.
Consider the following variation of bonus bidding on mineral
leases: A contract will be sold at an open progressive auction. In
particular, assume that the bidder willing to pay the most for the
contract will win it, but the winner need only pay as much as the
second highest bidder was willing to pay. Under the terms of the
contract, the winner may, at his own expense, extract and keep as much
oil as he wishes from a tract of land specified by the contract; in
turn, the winner must pay the bid-taker a royalty on each barrel of
oil extracted. In total, the bid-taker receives, from the winner, a
"bonus" payment for the contract itself, plus a royalty on the oil
extracted; non-winning bidders pay nothing to the bid-taker.
In our example, as throughout this paper, we assume the bidders
and the bid-taker to be risk neutral. Furthermore, the bid-taker and
bidders all have the same marginal gross value for each barrel of oil
extracted. For simplicity, we will measure oil production in units of
this common value; this implies a constant marginal gross value of
unity. On the other hand, a bidder's marginal cost to extract oil
increases with quantity as shown by the 45 degree lines in figures one
through five. Each bidder i knows his own marginal cost intercept
x. before the bidding starts; the bid-taker views the x 's as realiza-
tions of random variables with some known joint probability distribu-
tion. (In the figures, x, 1 . -nH v j ... t i - j j(1) a a (2) denote the smallest and second
smallest x. , respectively.) Finally, this entire sample specification,
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including this statement, is common knowledge to the bid-taker and to
all the bidders.
In addition to defining each bidder's marginal cost "curve," the
figures also displays the bidder's common, constant marginal values
for oil extracted. By assumption, we measure oil such that each unit
of oil has a marginal value of unity; thus, the top horizontal line in
each figure plots the bidders' marginal gross value for oil. The
lower horizontal line depicts a constant marginal value of a for oil
net of royalties; such a marginal value "curve" would be plausible if
the winner must pay a royalty of one minus a dollars on each dollar's
worth of oil extracted.
The winner must decide how much money to invest in extracting oil.
In our example, the winner knows his cost and value curves exactly.
Therefore, we may view the winner as deciding how much oil to extract
rather than how much money to spend extracting oil; we make the
distinction only because the first view relates more closely to
existing contracting models, while the alternative view appears more
appropriate in discussing the example. In particular, the winner pre-
sumably extracts oil until his marginal cost of extraction equals his
marginal value of oil net of any royalties.
Finally, a few comments on the choice of auction mechanism. While
the specified, "second price" mechanism may appear atypical in prac-
tice, the iterative process of refining the list of qualified bidders,
screening the bids actually received, and negotiating with one or more
finalists before finally awarding the contract imparts some of open
progressive auction, and therefore of second price auction, flavor to
-6-
many instances of competitive contracting. More important, a sub-
sequent theorem establishes—under conditions quite a bit more general
than those of the example—that no other auction mechanism that always
awards the contract to the bidder with the lowest marginal costs could
generate more expected revenue for the bid-taker. Fortuitously, the
chosen mechanism also makes for a particularly simple and compelling
prediction of how bidders will bid—bidding the net value of the
contract, gross of anything to be paid at the auction, constitutes a
dominant strategy. This greatly facilitates our later, explicit solu-
tion of the example. In all, no other auction mechanism could serve
the purposes of our example as well.
The Contracting Problem:
In this section, we consider the problem an individual faces when
writing a contract specifying how both he and a second individual will
respond to each possible observable outcome resulting from actions or
decision of the second individual. To be consistent with the remainder
of this paper, we refer to the first and second individuals as the "bid-
taker" and the "winner," respectively; the contracting literature refers
to them as the "principal" and the "agent." Of course, when offered a
specific contract, the winner will accept the contract only if doing so
is in his own best interests. Furthermore, if he accepts the contract,
the winner will make those decisions that are in his own best interest
given the terms of the contract. Naturally, the bid-taker would like
to maximize his own expected gain from letting the contract. Unfor-
tunately, he can only influence the winner, and therefore can only in-
fluence the final outcome, through his choice of the contract's terms.
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To illustrate the problem, look at our example. The bid-taker must
write a contract specifying how he and the winner split any oil extracted
by the winner. The contract requires that the winner pay all costs of
extracting the oil; the contract may also require the winner to pay some
fixed fee. While we will eventually let competitive bidding set the fee,
for now we require—as does the competitive contracting literature—that
the fee be specified exogenously of the contracting process. Of course,
if he accepts the contract, the winner will extract oil until his
marginal cost of extraction equals his marginal net value for extracted
oil. Furthermore, the winner will accept the contract only if, given
the information available to him at the time of the decision, he expects
to be able to gain at least as much from accepting the contract as from
doing whatever he would do if he did not accept the contract.
In general, each individual must have the opportunity to withdraw
from a competitive contracting process at one or more prespecified
points. Later, when competitive bidding sets the fee paid by the winner
for the contract, we will require that each bidder, if forced to bid
and to accept the offered contract if declared the winner of the bidding,
must be allowed at least one option yielding at least as much expected
utility as not bidding; for the case of risk neutral individuals, we
will assign a value of zero to not bidding, without any loss of gener-
ality. For the time being, however, we focus on the contract design
problem in isolation of competitive bidding. Without the option for
bidders to refrain from bidding, and without competitive bidding to set
a fee for winning the contract, the contract design literature restricts
its attention to only those contracts that allow the winner at least
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some pre-set gain in expected utility; the literature typically views
this lower bound as a fixed, but arbitrary constant. Presumably, by
specifying an appropriate value for this constant, the winner would be
happy accepting the offered contract if and only if it allows him at
least this specified amount of gain.
This lower limit on the winner's gain in effect limits the bid-
taker's possible gain to that possible if the winner and bid-taker were
to fully cooperate and then give the winner a gain equal to the lower
bound. We call contracts that achieve this maximum possible combined
bid-taker and winner gain "efficient." Ideally, the bid-taker would
like to let a contract that both is efficient and limits the winner's
gain to the smallest amount allowed. Therefore, we start by looking at
efficient contracts.
In our example, the winner must stop extracting oil precisely when
his marginal cost of extraction equals unity for the contract to be
efficient. Since our bid-taker can never independently verify the
winner's actual cost curve, the bid-taker—if he insists on using an
efficient contract—must set the royalty rate so as to induce the
winner to extract oil until the marginal cost equals unity. In our
example, only an a of unity provides the required inducement. Unfor-
tunately for the bid-taker, under this contract, the winner captures
all of the maximum possible combined profit.
The bid-taker might try to capture at least some of this profit by
charging bidders a fixed fee for the privilege of bidding. The fee
would be set by the bid-taker and would be independent of the bidder's
subsequent actions; for the moment, we ignore the example's assumption
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that non-winning bidders pay nothing to the bid-taker. Even though
bidder's estimates for the value of being allowed to bid may change
—
possible as a result of improved cost information—before the bidding
takes place, only those who pay the fee now will be allowed to bid.
The overall scheme remains efficient so long as the fee never scares
away all potential bidders. Thus, the bid-taker might capture at
least some of the profit.
Unfortunately, the bid-taker cannot realistically hope to set a
fee that results in him capturing essentially all of the maximum
possible combined profit. Indeed, whenever potential bidders' esti-
mates of costs and probability of winning differ, so will the bidders'
estimates of how much profit they could make from winning the
contract. Since bidders must estimate the value of the contract con-
ditional on their actually winning, all bidders except the eventual
winner will typically underestimate the value of the contract to the
actual winner. Thus, unless the bid-taker could somehow identify who
should win the contract before the winner had any cost information not
also known to the bid-taker—this would allow the bid-taker to only
offer the contract to this one bidder, and to offer it at a fee up to
the maximum profit this bidder could realize gross of the fee itself
—
the sum of the maximum fees that the bid-taker could collect would
generally be strictly less than the maximum combined expected profit
possible from a contract with an a of unity awarded to the appropriate
bidder.
Despite our failure to discover an efficient contract that limits
the winner's profits to an arbitrarily small fraction of the total
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possible combined profit, the contracting literature seems to suggest
that such contracts do indeed exist. In particular, Harris and Raviv
(1976) and Holmstrom (1979) employ models suggested by Mirrlees (1974,
1976) to prove the general existence of efficient contracts with
arbitrary lower bounds on the winner's expected utility in the case of
risk neutral preferences; these efficient contracts tend to have the
fixed fee flavor of the schemes discussed above for our example. For
more general preferences, they prove the existence of contracts
arbitrarily close to efficient if the bid-taker can with positive
probability—not necessarily with certainty—detect any shirking of
the winner from the decisions the bid-taker would wish if he knew all
the information known to the winner; these contracts typically
discourage the winner from ever shirking by imposing sufficiently
large penalties for those instances that the bid-taker does detect
shirking. However, either form of contract lacks the basic com-
petitive flavor of much real world contracting.
Not only does the contracting literature ignore the possible role
of bidding in selecting a winner, it also ignores the possible role of
bidding in determining a price or fee for the contract, or more
generally, in setting the winner's expected utility from the entire
process. Specifically, the literature—Dermondy (1983) provides an
extensive and up-to-date bibliography and overview—exogenously sets
the lower bound on the winner's expected utility. Many authors allow
an arbitrary, but exogenously set, lower bound. Some—see Leland
(1978) for an example—argue that, perhaps as a result of perfect com-
petition, the winner should have an expected gain of zero from winning
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the contract. Yet others, in effect, set the fee or price for the
contract at zero; the winner only pays, or is paid, a royalty or com-
mission based on actual production, revenue, or sales, as the case may
be; Stigletz (1974) and Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), for example, study
linear sharing in the context of sharecropping.
All this existing work replaces the role of bidding in selecting a
winner and in setting an expected utility for the winner's winning by
appropriately chosen assumptions—assumptions of limited realism or
practicality in the context of competitive contracting. With an eye
towards understanding the role of bidding in competitive contracting,
the next section examines the auction design problem. Perhaps an
appropriately chosen auction could replace some of the assumptions
made in the contracting literature.
The Auction Problem:
Simply put, what type of auction will maximize the bid-taker's
expected utility? Auctions differ in what information they reveal
about bidders to other bidders during the bidding; a first-price
sealed-bid auction reveals nothing while a progressive oral auction
may reveal quite a bit about nonwinning bidders to the eventual
winner. This difference in information may well result in different
prices in different auctions.
In particular, the survey by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) of the
auction and competitive bidding literature suggests that when comparing
various types of auctions, the closer the auction brings together all
the bidders' perceptions of the item's value, the less the eventual
winner's expected profit. Clearly, when all bidders have exactly the
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same information, and therefore the same perceptions, there is no
profit to be made by the winner; if all bidders have the same esti-
mate, precise or imprecise as it may be, for the value of the item,
then it seems unlikely that the item could sell for any less, or any
more, than this commonly estimated value. Alternatively, if the even-
tual winner's expected value for the item, conditional on winning, is
independent of all other bidders' information, then the price should
be independent of what information might be revealed during the
bidding and can depend only on how the winner is selected; Vickrey
(1961a, 1961b), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1985a, 1985b) show this to be true, in greater or
less generality, for the case of risk neutral bidders. (In the case
of averse bidders, a new aspect—a bidder's uncertainty about his
eventual profit—must be balanced against this bringing together of
bidders' perceptions.) If, however, revealing more information brings
the bidders' perceptions of the item's value closer together, then, as
shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1985a), an
auction revealing more information will generate at least as much
revenue for the bid-taker, and therefore result in more expected
profit for the bidders, as an auction revealing less information, all
other things being equal.
Therefore, let us try to bring together the bidders' perceived
values for a competitive let contract. We can do so in two different
ways. First, simply select the auction that reveals as much infor-
mation as possible. While this may have no effect on the winner's
profit in our example with its independent cost sources, in general
such a selection should minimize the winner's expected profit.
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Second, while not possible when auctioning a fixed object, in com-
petitive contracting we have the option of fiddling with the nature of
the item—that is, with the terms of the contract—being auctioned.
Specifically, note that for a equal to zero in our example, the winner
would be unlikely to extract any oil regardless of his cost curve. As
a result, both bidders would have exactly the same value—zero—for
the contract, and the bidders would be reduced to zero expected profit.
In general, the larger the share of any production the winner must pay
as a royalty to the bid-taker the less the bidders will disagree on the
contract's value and the lower the bidder's expected profits in the
auction.
However, in reducing the bidder's expected profits, we have also
decreased the efficiency of the contract—an a of zero gave zero pro-
duction and zero profit to the winner, while an a of unity gave the
efficient contract. Thus, unlike the case of auctioning a fixed
object where the size of the total pie—in other words, the total
realized value of the auctioned item—depends only on who wins it, in
the case of competitively let contracts, maximizing the size of the
bid-taker's slice of the pie requires carefully balancing any reduc-
tion in the size of the total pie. In general, therefore, the bid-
taker's expected utility might well be maximized through letting a
contract that is neither efficient, nor profitless for the winner, but
which involves a non-trivial amount of production or cost sharing in
excess of whatever sharing might be attributable to any need for risk
sharing.
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The Example Analyzed:
This section's examination of our example reveals the qualitative
nature of the tradeoffs in reducing a from unity. The figures pre-
viously used to introduce the example will now illustrate the trade-
offs. Not until the next section will we quantify the tradeoffs, and
calculate the optimal a and the corresponding expected bid-taker
profit.
We start by more clearly defining certain aspects of the example.
Specifically, the example, as currently stated, allows only constant
royalty rate contracts. In other words, we assume that the winner's
marginal value of production net of royalties, but gross of production
costs, equals a regardless of the level of production. Presumably,
the winner extracts oil, if any at all, until his marginal cost equals
this marginal value of a. For the bidder with the smaller x.—that& 1
is, the bidder i with x. equal to x...,.—this happens at q. in our
figures. The bidder with the second smallest x. would presumably
extract q„ units of oil if he were awarded the contract. Since the
highest and second highest bidder together determines both the winner
and the price of the contract in our example, we will ignore any other
bidders.
For convenience, think of each bidder as always submitting a
sealed bid. Our bid-taker, as previously stated, always awards the
contract to the highest bidder. In exchange for winning, the winner
pays the bid-taker the amount of the second highest bid in addition to
any royalties specified by the contract. Of course, a real bid-taker
might well ignore negative bids—he might reasonably balk at paying
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someone to take on a profitable contract. Thus, we require all bids
to be non-negative. Still, a bidder with an x. greater than a might
want to avoid bidding on a contract that can lose him money. However,
bidding zero and doing nothing if perchance he wins the contract pro-
vides a bidder an option, as required by our model, that leaves the
bidder no worse off than he would have been by not bidding.
Having defined the example to the extent necessary for this sec-
tion, observe now that for any specific, fixed a, the second price
nature of our example results in each bidder having a dominant stra-
tegy. In particular, consider two cases. For x. greater than a,
bidder i has no possible value for the contract and can, therefore, do
no better than by bidding zero. On the other hand, for x. less than
or equal to a, bidder i can do no better than bidding an amount equal
to the net profit he would make from winning the contract at the price
he—not the second highest bidder—bid; by doing so, he wins the
contract whenever, and only when, his break even value for the
contract at least equals the price actually charged. Note that a bid-
der's chance of winning, as well as his profit conditional on winning,
may well depend on how others bid. However, regardless of how others
bid, no one bidder by himself can do better than by following this
dominant strategy. Furthermore, in order to do as well with this
strategy, the bidder must be certain that any changes in his bidding
have absolutely no effect on when he might win the contract; in prac-
tice, this is rarely possible. Thus, we have described the essen-
tially unique dominant bidding strategy.
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With this description of how bidders will bid, we can now describe
the bid-taker's revenue as a function of a and of the bidders' x 's.
Specifically, the bid-taker's revenue consists of two components— the
amount bid by the second highest bidder, and the royalty payments
—
both paid by the winner. If only the eventual bidder bids a positive
amount, then the bid-taker's revenue consists solely of royalties.
These royalties total an amount equal to the area of the boldly out-
lined rectangle in figures three and four; the area reduces to zero as
a increases to one. If at least two bidders bid positively, then the
bid-taker's total revenue equals the area of the boldly outlined
pentagons in figures one and two; this pentagon simplifies to the
shaded triangle as a increases to unity. Finally, the bid-taker has
zero revenue if, as in figure five, no bidder bids positively.
Now we can investigate what happens as a decreases from unity. In
figures three and four, the bid-taker's revenue increases from nothing
to the area of a rectangle. In .figures one and two, the bid-taker's
revenue changes as the triangle becomes a pentagon, which itself
changes in shape. Nothing changes in the fifth figure. Thus, in all
but the second and fifth figures, the bid-taker's revenue increases at
least linearly in the amount by which he reduces a. Fortunately, if,
as often happens, the probability of the two highest bids being within
e of each other vanishes as e shrinks to zero, then so too will the
cases depicted in the second and fifth figures occur with vanishing
probability as a approaches unity. So, at least for sufficiently
small reductions of a below unity, the bid-taker benefits roughly in
proportion to the size of the reduction; we verify this quantitatively
in the next section.
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Of course, as a becomes smaller, the case depicted in the first
figure becomes less likely. Ultimately, as a approaches zero, the
case of the fifth figure predominates and the bid-taker's revenue
shrinks to zero. Presuming that all these changes occur smoothly with
respect to changes in a, an a strictly between zero and unity—and
therefore, a royalty rate strictly between zero and unity—maximizes
the bid-taker's expected revenue.
The Example "Solved":
Now, we finally quantify the tradeoffs discovered in the previous
sections. In this section we express the bid-taker's revenue as a
mathematical function of a and of the x.'s. Taking the expectation of
this function over the x.'s yields an expression for the bid-taker's
expected revenue as a function solely of a. An a of approximately .7
maximizes this expected revenue, and gives an expected revenue approx-
imately 60 percent greater than that from the efficient contract. In
concluding, we modify the example slightly to allow variable royalty
rate contract; although we do not claim to find the optimal variable
royalty rate contract, we do present one that increases the bid-
taker's expected revenue above that possible with constant royalty
rates.
Before proceeding with the calculations, we must specify the
number of bidders, and the distribution of their x.'s. To keep the
calculations as simple as possible, we analyze the case of only two
bidders. Furthermore, for the same reason, we assume that the x.'s
'
l
are the outcomes of independent random variables uniformly distributed
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on the unit interval. Finally, we explicitly restrict a to lie in the
closed unit interval.
The bid-taker's revenue, as shown in the five figures, equals zero
if Xx.x is at least a, (l-a)(a-x.
1
. ) if a is between x, .. v and x,„^,
1 2
and (l-a)(a-x,.J +y (x,~.-a) if a is at least */?>>• Note that the
revenue depends on x. and x„ through their order statistics. In our
case, the order statistics x,..v and x, «v are realizations of random
variables with density functions of 2(l-x) and 2x, respectively, on
the unit interval, and zero elsewhere. Thus, the bid-taker's expected
revenue is given by the following functions solely of a:
a a
/ (l-a)(a-x)2(l-x)dx + / j (x-a) 2xdx
x=0 x=0
which simplifies to:
2 4 3 5 4
a __ a + _ a .
To find the optimum a, differentiate this last expression with
respect to a to obtain the following:
2 5 3
2a - 4a + rr a
,
which may be written as:
-
i + (1-a) + (1-a) 2 - | (1-a) 3 .
This last expression reveals that for sufficiently small e, reducing a
from unity to 1-e increases the bid-taker's expected revenue by roughly
e/3, thereby verifying the previous section's intuition about propor-
tional benefits.
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Solving the next to last expression set equal to zero gives criti-
cal values of zero, (6-/6)/5, and (6+/6)/5. For a in the unit interval,
an a of (6-/o~)/5—approximately .70101—uniquely maximizes the bid-
taker's expected revenue. Thus, a royalty rate of very nearly 30 per-
cent will generate more total expected revenue for the bid-taker than
any other constant royalty rate between zero and unity. Not only does
the optimal contract involve a very substantial royalty rate, but the
optimal contract will also generate approximately 60 percent more
expected revenue for the bid-taker than the efficient contract. Our
bid-taker benefits dramatically by letting a very inefficient contract!
As dramatic as these results may be, the bid-taker can do even
better if allowed to use a variable royalty rate contract. Specifi-
cally, the bid-taker can expect a revenue 75 percent greater than from
the efficient contract by specifying the royalty rate to start at 50
percent for the first tiny bit of production, and decrease linearly to
zero when production reaches a full unit of oil. By so varying the
royalty rate, the bid-taker tends to get smaller royalties on the win-
ner's last bit of production—thereby improving the winner's choice of
production level—but more than makes up for this loss by the higher
royalty on earlier production together with the royalty on oil which
would not have been extracted under a higher royalty rate. Perhaps
our example's bid-taker could do even better yet with some non-linear
royalty rate; we do not know.
On reflection, we must be careful in applying the above results
for a specific example to the whole world of competitively let
contracts. While in the second part of this paper, we will prove that
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a bid-taker quite generally maximizes his expected revenue by letting
non-efficient contracts, we will not quantify the amount of sharing
involved or the amount by which the non-efficiency increases the bid-
taker's expected revenue. Indeed a closer look at our example
suggests that its independence of costs and its limit of two bidders
may well each serve to magnify both the amount of sharing desired as
well as the benefit the bid-taker might expect from such non-efficient
contracts in more realistic situations. Nonetheless, we have pre-
sented, and provided the intuition behind, an example—and presumably
there are many more, more realistic examples—in which the bid-taker
gains substantially from a royalty rate much larger than can be attri-
buted to any need for risk-sharing—there is none in our example!—and
so large that the resulting contract is far from efficient.
The Model:
This second part of the paper starts by defining a model of com-
petitive bidding. We define the model mainly in terms of its notation,
first describing the "players," then their information, and finally
their preferences. Subsequent sections develop and analyze the model.
Assume a fixed number of potential bidders, not all of whom need
necessarily bid on any specific contract. Specifically, let the
subscripts i, j, and k range from one to n and denote individual bid-
ders; the subscript zero denotes the bid-taker. Before the bidding
starts, each bidder privately observes a signal s. from an arbitrary
probability space. We assume that the outcome of the auction and
contract depends on each s. only through some real valued "rating"
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function a.(s.); in other words, each bidder's pre-bidding information
may be summarized by a single number a.. Hereafter, we suppress the
underlying s.'s and deal directly with the resulting a.'s.
Now looking at the bid-taker, let o~ be a constant, later inter-
preted as the reservation price or screening level of the bid-taker.
We capture the effect of an uncertain screening level by adding a
phantom bidder j with the uncertain level as his a.. We incorporate
any information, possibly multi-dimensional, observed by the bid-taker
after choosing the auction mechanism, but before the bidding starts,
by adding an appropriate number of phantom bidders j, with the a.'s
chosen to reflect the bid-taker's information and scaled so that they
will be less than a„ with probability one.
To simplify later expressions, let a_. denote the vector (a
,
a
,
..., a. . . a., n , ..., a ); for i different from k, let a . , denote al-l i+l' • n ~i,k
similar vector, but with both a. and a. removed. The limit "a
. < a"
l k -l —
on an integral means "v.: a
.
_< a V j t 0, i;" similarly, "a_. , _< a"
means "c
.
: a. < a V j # 0, i, k." Finally, let a. denote the maximum
a
, j = 0, 1, ..., i-1, i+l, ..., n.
Our model differs from previous models in its explicit parameteri-
zation on what information the price might depend. Let r.(a_.) be an
arbitrary function a_., and let r. denote any specific value of the
function. Interpret r. as the minimal statistic of cr . through which
the expected price paid by i depends on a ..
The function r.(a_.) may take many forms. For a sealed bid first
price auction, the function might be a constant, thus containing no
information about a
.; in a sealed bid second price auction, r.(a .)
-i ' i -l
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equals o*. The two special cases of r.(a .) = a and r.(cr .) = a
.
i i -i i i -i -i
correspond to two extreme types of progressive oral auctions. More
generally, r.(a_.) may give upper and lower bounds (possibly infinite)
on each component of cr_.. The statistic r. might even be a subjective
probability distribution of <?_., where the distribution itself varies
with a .
.
-l
Determining the functional form of r.(a_.) corresponding to any
specific auction may be very difficult. Indeed, the form may well
depend on the bidding strategies used by the bidders. However, we
need not worry about determining the specific form of the function; we
only need that each specific auction (the description of which in-
cludes a description of bidders' strategies) may be characterized by
some form of r.(a .) function,
l -l
To complete the description of the information, let F.
_.
(a_. |a. ,r
.
)
denote the cumulative distribution of o . conditional on a. and r..
-l 11
This distribution implies conditional distributions F.
_.
.(or |a.,r.,o\)
1 y X y K 1 J K 1 X K.
and F.
,
(a, |a.,r.) of a
. , and of a, . (We consistently abuse notation
X m K. K. 1 X ~~X j K. K.
by using the same symbol for both a random variable and for its realiza-
tion.) For simplicity, we assume that F. (a, |a.,r.) is dif ferentiable
X K. K. X X
with respect to a, at a equal to a. for almost all a. given r.. Roughly
speaking, this means zero probability of tied a.'s; more precisely, for
any r. there is a zero probability of i seeing a a. such that there is a
positive probability of another bidder j having a. equal to a
.
. Without
this assumption, our derivations would be complicated by the possible
need to employ the techniques developed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans , Milgrom
and Weber (1983) to handle cases with positive probability of tied a.'s.
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A bidder's expected value—we assume that the bid-taker and all
the bidders are risk neutral—for any particular outcome of an auction
depends on the price and value of the contract. Let p.(a.,r.) be a
real valued function of a. and r.. Interpret this function as the11
expected amount i pays (possibly negative) conditional on a. and r..
Note that nonwinnihg bidders may pay a non-zero amount.
The value of the contract depends on the decisions made by the
winner after winning. So, before describing bidders' value for the
contract, define a real valued function q.(a.,r.). Interpret q. as
' ^1 l l r ^i
the quantity of production—or more generally, the level of effort—by
i, as a function of a. and r., if i wins the contract. Assume that11
the bid-taker can observe q.. Note that we allow the winner's deci-
l
sions to depend on r.. By doing so, we presume that the winner knows
everything on which the price he pays is based before he makes his
decisions on how to perform the contract. Such an assumption holds if
either the bidding itself reveals r.—for example, in an oral auction,
the price paid by the winner equals his last bid, which only depends
on information known to the winning bidder at the time of his last
bid—or if the bid-taker publicly reveals all information used to
determine the winner and price of the contract, and does so before the
winner decides how to perform the contract—a common feature of many
contracting processes. Note also that making q. a deterministic func-
tion in effect assumes the winner makes his decisions using only infor-
mation known (by someone) at the time of bidding; this simple case
suffices to establish the basic results of this paper. More generally,
the winner's decisions might be allowed to depend on information
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observed after bidding by viewing q . as a random variable whose
distribution depends on a. and r..r 11
Now, let v, (a.,a
.
,q.) be a real valued function denoting the
expected value of the contract to i conditional on the specified a.,
a
. , and q.. This allows us to define U. (a
.
,r. ,y
.
)
—the expected
-l l i i i' i r
utility of bidder i when he observes a. and r., but claims to haveJ i i'
observed y . , as a function of r.—by
f v.{a. y a . ,q.(y. ,r.))dF, .(a . la. ,r . )-p.(y. ,r .
)
j
.ii' -i'^i w i' i i,-i -i i i 11 i
a .<y.
-i—J \
for y _> a„, and zero otherwise. We assume that the underlying func-
tions are sufficiently regular so that this function exists, and so
that any derivations and integrals hereafter specified exist for
almost every r..J l
Finally, look at the problem for a specific bidder i. For con-
venience, drop the subscript "i" whenever no confusion results from
doing so. However, remember that all the functions in the model may
vary with i; in particular, the function p.(a.,r.) will be independent
of i only for models otherwise sufficiently symmetric.
Regret-Free Mechanisms:
This paper focuses on regret-free auction mechanisms. A mechanism
is said to be regret-free (for bidder i) if there exist, commonly
known, functions a, r, p, q, v, and F_. and a constant a_ satisfying
the following four conditions:
(1) The item goes to the j (possibly j = 0) with the largest a.
(ties with a„ are always broken in favor of the bid-taker; other ties
occur with probability zero by assumption).
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(2) The expected amount paid by i (averaged over all a . ) con-
ditional on a. and r. is p(a ,r.) when a > a_, and zero when a. <^ a~.
(3) U(a
i
,r
i
,a
i
) > iKa^r^y^V O^T^j^ and i.
(4) U(a Q ,ri ,a )
= ¥ r±t and i.
Now, examining these four conditions one by one, the first con-
dition requires, a necessary condition for efficiency, that the item
be awarded to the individual j with the largest a.. If no bidder j
has a a. strictly greater than a„, then the bid-taker keeps the item.
In sufficiently symmetric models with bidders whose strategies are
raonotonic functions of their a.'s, this condition may be interpreted
as awarding the item to the highest bidder whenever the high bid
exceeds the reservation price set by the bid-taker. The second con-
dition requires that bidder i pay nothing whenever his a. is less than
or equal to a„. If a . is less than or equal to 0"
n
, bidder i is effec-
tively excluded from participating in the auction, thus the interpre-
tation of a
n
as a screening level.
While the first two conditions provided interpretations for
various notation, the remaining two conditions restrain the form of
the function p(a.,r.)» In particular, the third condition requires
that bidder i, knowing his a, and having seen his r. could not have
increased his expected utility by pretending he had observed some dif-
ferent value for a.—a natural extension to our model of what Myerson
calls "incentive compatibility." Finally, for U(a.,r.,a.) monotonic in
a., the fourth condition basically requires that a bidder be screened
from the auction if and only if his expected utility would have been
negative; Myerson calls this "individual rationality."
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The concept of regret mechanisms corresponds closely to that of
Nash equilibria, with some important differences. Basically, to be
regret-free, the outcome of an auction must be such that no bidder
would have been able to gain by bidding differently had he had, at the
time of bidding, all the information on which payment depends. Clearly,
dominant strategy Nash equilibria are regret-free. Furthermore, any
Nash equilibrium for an auction in which the amount paid by an indivi-
dual depends only on his own bid and on whether or not he wins the auc-
tioned object—this includes most auctions mechanisms actually used—is
also regret free. In addition, any Nash equilibrium for an instance of
competitive contracting in which the bid-taker must publicly reveal,
shortly after awarding the contract, all information obtained from the
bids that is used in setting the terms of the contract, and in which
the winner may renegotiate the contract if and when he obtains informa-
tion that would have led him to bid differently had he had it at the
time he bid will also be regret-free. However, non-dominant strategy
Nash equilibria for sealed bid auctions in which the price paid by the
winner also depends on non-winning bids—a common aspect of full bidder
surplus extracting mechanisms—will typically not be regret-free.
Prices Characterized:
The conditions of a regret-free mechanism clearly restrict how
p(a.,r.) may depend on a. and r.. The following theorem states a
necessary restriction:
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Theorem 1
For regret-free mechanisms, for almost every r., p(a.,r.) =
/ v(a*,a_i ,q(a*,r i ))dF(a_i \a*,T± )
a
-i<a i
i d
+ J T" ! vU ' CT ^^(y.r ))L dF(a |5,r )d? for all a ,
5=^ a_
±<g
Proof: Condition (3) implies that for almost every r
.
,
— u(a
.
,r
.
,y) I =
i dy l i 'y=a.
for all a.. Therefore,
l '
T~ p(y>r . ) I = -;— ( v(o . ,o . ,q(a. ,r.))dF(a .|a.,r.)|dy l 'y=a. dy J „ i -i i 1 -i ' i* l 'y=a.J
±
J a <y J i
+ d7 / v(a i ,a_i ,q(y,r 1 ))dF(a_ |a. ,r.) | .
a
-i<a i
Now, for a. >^ an , integrate both sides of this equation to obtain an
expression for p(a.,r.). In particular, looking for the moment only
at the first term of the right hand side
/ fr J v( Z ,a_ i ,q( Z ,r i ))dF(a_.|z,r i )|
z<a. y a .<y
— i -l—
= / 2 / v( Z ,a_.,q(z,r
i
))dF(a_
i
|z ,r ,<J
k
)dF(a
k
|z ,r.)
| =
z<a . k*i a . . <z ' k
— l -i,k—
- / s / v(a*,a_i ,q(a*,r.))dF(a k k*,r ,a )dF(a |a*,r ) |
z<a . k#i a
.
. <z
' k
— i -i,k—
= / ^ / v(a*,a_.,q(a*,r.))dF(a |a*,r ,a k )dF(ak |a*,r .
)
a. <a . k*i a
.
. <a,
'
k— l -i,k— k
= Z / / v(a*,a.,q(a*,r i ))dF(a_. fc |a*,r ,ak )dF(a k |a*,r )k=i a, <o . a .
,
<a,
'
k— l -i,k— k
= / v(a*,a ,q(a*,r ))dF(a_ |a*,r.).
a .<a.
x x x
-l— i
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Therefore,
p(a,,r ) =/ v(a*,a.,q(a*,r,))dF(a . k*.^)
o . <a
.
-l— 1
•i d
+ / §-/ v(C,a ,q(y,r))| dF(o |5,r)d5+c(r)
Thus, showing that c(r.) equals zero would complete the proof. How-
ever, using the above expression for p(a.,r.) yields the equation
U(a
Q
,r
i
,a ) =/ v(a ,a_
i
,q(a
()
,r
i
))dF(a_
i
\o Qi r
±
)
a
-ila
+ [/ v(a*,a_ i ,q(a*,r i ))dF(a_i |a*,r.)+c(r.)].
a
-i<a
However, since a* = a„ whenever a.
_< crn¥j # i, this simplifies to
U(a
n
,r.,a
n
) = -c(r.). The fourth condition therefore assures that
c(r.) be zero for almost every r., as required to complete the proof.
Note that in the extreme form of progressive auction for which
r.(a.) = a (i.e., the button auction of Milgrom and Weber), p(a.,r.)
equals v(a* ^a .) if a. exceeds a„; the price is zero otherwise. In
this case, the information is such that p(a.,r.) may be interpreted as
the amount (no expectations needed) paid by i if he wins with a. when
the others' a.'s happen to be given by o_.. Here, the price happens
to be the value the item would have had to i had he had a a. which
l
were tied to win the item. This result coincides with those pre-
viously obtained by others for this particular auction.
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In general, different bidders j will have the same function
p.(a.,r.) only if they also have the same functions v.(a. y o .), q.(a.,r.)
and F.
.
(a_. |a
.
,r
.
). Thus, asymmetric models typically result in
J
»
—
J J J J
asymmetric regret-free mechanisms. As a result, in sufficiently asym-
metric models, forcing the bid-taker to treat bidders symmetrically
with regard to how the amounts they pay is calculated may require
awarding the item to some bidder other than the bidder who values it
most highly. (Vickrey gives an example of an asymmetric model in
which the equilibrium allocation of the item may be non-Pareto optimal.)
The given form of p(a.,r.) is necessary, but may not be sufficient.
In particular, consider the following, symmetric, two bidder auction
example: a, and o~ are jointly, uniformly distributed in that band
within the unit square lying within some (small) e of the main diagonal.
Let v.(o.,o .) equal a. and let r.(cr .) equal a_. While it is clearlyii'-i^ 1 1 -i ^ J
possible to calculate the expression given above for p(a.,r.), we know
of no Nash equilibrium for this example.
Observe that the expected amount paid by a bidder depends on the
screening level a
n
through the quantity a*. In Myerson's work, and we
expect the same to be true here, the bid-taker retains the item with
positive probability when he sets the screening level a_ to maximize
his expected revenue. However, in our model, the search for an opti-
mal a
n
may be confounded by the ambiguity in how r.(a_.) might vary
with a_. For example, in actual progressive auctions, does i the
expected amount paid by i depend on all others' a.'s, or only on those
a.'s that exceed the screening level? Thus, the optimal screening
level may depend on rather specific details of the auction.
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Our model does not explicitly include the possibility of a reser-
vation price; that is, the possibility that the highest bidder would
have a positive expected value for winning, but is nonetheless
screened from participating. Replacing the function c. (r. ) by some
strictly smaller function would in effect create a situation similar
to that of a nontrivial reservation price. Clearly, as Milgrom and
Weber have already observed for three specific auctions, such a reser-
vation price reduces the bid-taker's expected revenue below what it
would have been had the bid-taker effected the same screening level
through, say, an appropriate entry fee paid by all bidders.
Effect of Revealed Information:
Having characterized the expected price paid by each bidder in
regret-free mechanisms, we now use that characterization to study the
effect on the bid-taker's expected revenue of revealing more infor-
mation to the bidders. Start by defining r'(a_.) to be a refinement
of—in other words, to contain more information than—r(a_.) if and
only if there exists a function R such that r(a ) = R(r'(a_.)) for all
a. . Note that there generally exists a cumulative distribution func-
tion F" such that
dF(a_
i
|a
i
,r.(t_.)) = I dF "( a _i l cr i > r i ( z_ 1 ). r i( z_ 1 )) dF ( z_ i l a i » r i < t - i ))
Z
-i
However, when r' is a refinement of r, this equation may be rewritten
as
dF (a_i |a1 ,ri(t_i )) = / dF'(a_. |a . ,r^( z _. ))dF(z_. |a.,r . (t_.))
z
.
-l
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for some cumulative distribution function F'. This allows us to state
the following theorem:
Theorem 2 : If o_, conditional on r. is independent of a . , and r. is
a refinement of r., then / p(a . ,r (z.) )dF(z_. |a .,r.) = p(a.,r ).
Z
-i
Proof: For each fixed value of r.,
1
/ p(a i ,r|(z_i ))dF(z_i |a 1 ,r i )
z .
-l
- / / v(a*,a_i ,q(a*,R(r^(z_.)))dF(a_i |a*,r.(z_i ))dF( Z_ i |a.,r i )
z . a .<a.
-l -l— i
a
i r d
+ / /
X
fe J v(?,a_i ,q(y,R(r
t (z_.)))] dF(a
. |? ,r^(z_.) )dF(z_. |a.,r.)d
Note that dF(z_. \a
.
,r
. ) , and therefore also the entire integrands
above, will be zero unless R(r. (z .)) = r.. So, making this substitu-
tion, and then taking terms independent of z. outside the integral
over z
,
yields
/ v(a*,a q(a*,r )) / dF(a , |cr*,r ! (z ))dF(z |a , ,r )
a .<o.
1
z A
xl 111
-l— l -l
+ /
± [±- ! v(C ( a_.,q(y,r.))] / dF(a_. \% ,r ! (z ) )dF(z \a r )d£
^ =a a
-i<? z -i
which, by our hypothesis, must be equal to
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/ v(a*,a_.,q(a*,r.)) / dF(a_. |a*,r^(z_.))dF(z_ i |a*,r.)
a .<a
.
z
-l— 1 -l
+ / * lj=! vC^a^.qCy,^))] / dF(a_. fg ,r ! (z_.))dF(z_i |g ,r.)d
^ =a ff±i? Z
-i
= / v(a*,a_i ,q(a*,r i ))dF(a_ i |a*,r i )
-l— i
a
i r d
+ ! [^ I v(C,a_ i ,q(y,r i ))] y=? dF(a_.|c,r i )d5?=a a
-i<?
= p(a.,r.), giving the claimed result.
By letting r. in the above theorem be the informationless statistic,
or, alternatively, by letting r. (z_.) be z_. itself, we get the
following corollary to Theorem 2:
Corollary : For any fixed function q, if or . is independent of a
.
,
then any regret free mechanism yields the same expected revenue to the
bid-taker.
This provides a result for competitive contracting analogous to that
previously mentioned for auctions.
Now, the following theorem states the effect of having the price
depend on more information when a . need not be independent of a .
:
-l r l
Theorem 3: If for x. > x„ , the random variable Z . .. with cumulative1—2*
~i>l
distribution function ( dF(a . k,r.(z .))dF(z . Ia.,x..) stochasticallyj
-i '^ ' i v -i -l ' i ' 1 J
z .
-l
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dominates the random variable Z_. ~ with cumulative distribution func-
tion / dF(a_. |C ,r (z_ ))dF(z_. \o
.
,x„) , and if furthermore,
z.
d
v(a*,a. ,q(a*,r. )) and hr- v(£ ,a_i ,q(y,r i >) ] . are monotonically non-
decreasing in a. , then for r . a refinement of r .
:
/ p(a i ,r^(z_i ))dF(z_ i |a i ,r i ) 2 PC^.^).
z .
-l
Proof : The proof follows the steps in the proof of Theorem 2, except
for replacing "which, by our hypothesis, must be equal to" by "which,
by our hypotheses, must be at least."
This theorem provides a result for competitive contracting analogous
to that previous mentioned for auctions. In particular, the more
refined the information available to the bidders, the greater the bid-
taker's expected revenues. Note also that in the case of competitive
contracting, unlike the case of auctions, refining the information
increases the set of possible q functions, and therefore may allow the
bid-taker to select a q function that increases his expected revenue
further.
The Sub-Optimality of Efficient Contracts:
Finally, this section uses the machinery and results of previous
sections to give rather general conditions under which efficient
contracts can be shown to generate less expected revenue for the bid-
taker than an appropriately chosen inefficient contract. In par-
ticular, say q(a ,r.) is efficient if it solves
l~ vn-( x )| t \ + J -r— v.(a.,a.,x)| , N dF(a.,r.)=0dx Oi 'x=q(a.,r.) dx l l -l , x=q(a.,r.) -i l11 a .<a
.
i'i
-l— l
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for all a. and all r., where v~.(x) denotes the bid-taker's expected
1 1 Oi K
value derived from bidder i winning and producing an amount x. Note
that even if the winner keeps all the production, the bid-taker's
value may still vary with the level of production; for example, the
bid-taker's value may depend on the extent to which a mineral lease is
depleted.
We compare the bid-taker's expected revenue under q.(a.,r.) to
that under q.(a.,r.) (which we define to be equal to q„(a.,r.) -M i i' l M M l l
A(6(a.,r.), where A is non-negative, 6(a.,r.) is strictly positive (or,
at least strictly positive with high enough probability when measured
with respect to a. and r.), and all the functions are sufficiently
regular so that all subsequent expressions are uniformly bounded).
Indeed, we focus on 6(ct ,r.)'s which are constant over much of their
range. In particular, for A strictly positive, let 6(a.,r.) equal
unity for a. and r. such that q.(a.,r.) is at least A, and let 5(a.,r.)J l i M i 11 ' i l
equal to q.(a ,r )/A otherwise. Note that for this form of 6(a.,r.),
as A goes to zero, q.(a,,r.) converges to q.(a.,r.)« Note also that a
constant royalty rate of A in our example results in q(a.,r.) equal to
q.(a.,r ). Now we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4: If r.(a.,r„) is a refinement of a*, and -=— v_.(q) is con-
l i' l dx Oi n
stant for almost all q resulting from q(a.,r.), then for sufficiently
small, but strictly positive, A, the regret-free mechanism (if any
exists) with q.(a.,r.) generates at least as much—and typically
strictly greater—expected revenue for the bid-taker than any regret-
free mechanism with q.(a.,r.).
^i l l
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Proof: Under q, the expected amount of revenue from bidder i for any
fixed a. and r. is p. (a ,r ), which equals
/ v(o*,o 1> q i (a*,r 1 ))dF(a_ i |a*,r i )
a
-i<a i
a.
+ /
X % ! (5,ff_1 ,qCy,r1))] dF(a_± |c,r)dC
On the other hand, under q, the amount becomes
/ v(a*,a_i ,(q.(a*,r i )-A5(a 1 ,r.)))dF(a_i |a*,r.)
a
.
<a.
-l— 1
a.
+ J % I v(5,a (J (q,r )-A6(y,r )))] dF(a |5,r )d5,
Expanding this in a Taylor series around q gives the amount under
q plus a difference of
- 4/
o
6(o*,r.) L. v(a*
>
o..
>
x)|
x=
-
(a * >ri)
dF(<,..|o*,r.)
-1— 1
°- A 1i d
-A/
-^ / [v(5,a x)| -
( }
6(y,r ) £- q (y,r.)]dF(a |c,r.
E=a„ dx a ,<€
ix q^y,^; ayC
_1l^
-A C S/ ,/(5 '°-l'x) lx™ Cy,r ( )-a7 5(y,rl )UdF(0-i |e ' rl )d55=a_ a
. <^
M i w ' i ; J
-i—
plus terms with higher orders of A, which we hereafter ignore because
for sufficiently small A they will be negligible.
Now, since r. is a refinement of a* a* may be calculated from r.
i l
and we may move 5(a*,r.) outside the integral over a .. This means
that the first term of the above difference reduces to
t>*
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1 I' 1
d -
Note that as A goes to zero, -=— q. is more and more likely to be zero;
2
therefore the third term goes to zero with order A and will hereafter
be ignored. Finally, under our hypothesis, the second term is non-
negative, and typically strictly positive. However, in addition to
any change in expected revenue, the bid-taker's expected value for the
production level itself goes from v„. (q. (a . ,r , )) to v~ . (q(a
.
,r
.
))—an
increase of -A6(o.,r.) -r— vn .(x| * , J if we ignore higher orderl* l dx Oi 'x=q.(a.,r.) fe 6ni i i
terms of A.
Thus, in going from q(a.,r.) to q(a.,r.) the bid-taker gains at
least—and typically more than—the following:
A[6(CT*,r,) ~- vn,(x)| - , . N -6(a.,r.) ~ vn,(x)| - , J
' l dx Oi 'x=q.(a*,r.) i' l dx Oi 'x=q
.
(a
.
,r
.
)
M i l ^i l l
plus higher order terms in A. However, for sufficiently small A, this
last expression is almost always equal to zero under our hypotheses on
the term of 5 and v
n
.. Thus, for sufficiently small A, in going from
q to q , the bid-taker typically gains—as was the case in our example
—
an amount strictly positive and first order in A. Thus, the bid-taker
maximizes his expected revenue by using an appropriate, inefficient
contract.
Although the above theorem includes a variety of restrictive
hypotheses, weakening any one hypothesis slightly should not affect
the result. Indeed, the basic result may well be true under much less
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restrictive hypotheses. In any case, the theorem and its proof indi-
cate that our example is not unique or even special in the bid-taker
being able to expect more revenue from competitively letting an
appropriately chosen inefficient contract than from competitively
letting the efficient contract.
Discussion:
This paper provides some basic insights into designing competitive
contracting processes. In the process, we established several new
results. More fundamental, however, may be the result that, at least
for the class of problems considered by this paper, the effects of
competitively bidding should not be ignored when designing a contract
that is to be let competitively. As a consequence, this paper may
raise many more questions than it settles—we will examine a few such
questions in this section.
While the intuition underlying the results of this paper clearly
hint at a general conjecture that optimal non-competitively let
contracts involve more cost or production sharing than optimal non-
competitively let contracts, we fall short of establishing such a
general result in at least two dimensions. First, we assumed the bid-
taker and bidders to be risk neutral. This simplified the analysis by
permitting for an explicit characterization of the expected price paid
by each bidder; the conclusions themselves do not depend—at least not
in any obvious way—on this assumption. Thus, we might reasonably
expect that the use of appropriately powerful mathematics could
establish the suboptimality of efficient contracts for more general
preferences than we considered so far.
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Second, the model assumes that the bid-taker can observe whether
or not the winner makes decisions according to specified q function.
Again, this assumption streamlined our analysis. However, it rules
out the many interesting contracting problems in which the winner
bases his decisions, at least in part, on information he obtains after
the award of the contract, information that the bid-taker cannot
discover through the bidding process. Furthermore, our assumption
also rules out the many interesting contracting problems in which the
final outcome—the outcome observable by the bid-taker—is only
stochastically linked with the winner's decisions. For example, in
the case of a contract for a jet aircraft, the winning firm clearly
learns something relevant about its costs and about the available
technologies in the process of producing the first plane. In addi-
tion, not only is it impractical for the government to observe or
discover all decisions made by the winner, the government can only
imprecisely measure or determine the outcome of the contract—in other
words, the precise quality and characteristics of the plane that is
actually produced. Again, we might reasonably expect that appropriate
mathematics applied to an appropriately revised model would extend our
result on the suboptimality of efficient contracts to more general
contracting environments.
Despite its limitations, the model does represent a significant
step forward in modelling auctions and competitive bidding. In par-
ticular, by including the statistic r. as a parameter, the model
includes a great variety of different auction mechanisms as special
cases. This gave us the second and third theorems of the paper with
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hardly any additional work. Moreover, this approach to investigating
competitive bidding might facilitate the investigation of other issues;
for example, the effect of what bidders know about the number of
competitors—two extreme cases being that the bidders have only a
probabilistic model of the number, and that bidders may submit bids
contingent on the number of competitors bidding—may be viewed as the
effect of the bidding mechanism itself revealing different amounts of
information about which potential competitors have information that
leads them to make a (non-trivial) bid. Therefore, in addition to pro-
viding some basic insights into a new field, this paper also introduces
a new approach for examining not only questions in this new field, but
possibly also questions in more established fields.
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